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Abstract-Despite their worldwide adoption by policy makers as 
the Holy Grail for entrepreneurship and business development, 
the effectiveness of business incubation programs remain 
elusive, primarily plagued by untenable evaluation methods. 
This paper develops an in-depth analysis on those 
methodological and institutional factors that prohibit the use 
of theoretically sound solutions such as the Experimental 
Method in evaluation practice.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Business incubators are intended to guide starting 
enterprises through their growth process with a nurturing 
environment and hence reflect a strong endeavor to promote 
innovation and entrepreneurship with dedicated policy 
interventions [1, 2]. However, so far there has been little 
solid evidence available to ratify the effectiveness of 
business incubators and most researchers agree that the 
existing literature is seriously plagued by methodological, 
theoretical and empirical limitations in the process of 
evaluating the performance and impact of business 
incubators [3-5]. Yet since the 1980s, the interest, 
confidence and investment scale in associated programs 
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continue to soar, not only in industrialized countries such as 
the U.S. and Western Europe but also in industrializing and 
emerging countries like China and Brazil [6-8]. 
While an enormous amount of land, money and human 
resources have been poured into the incubator industry, 
public concerns about the effectiveness of incubators and on 
the soundness of those methods devised to evaluate 
incubators are increasing as well. One of the main 
responses has been a series of nationwide surveys of the 
incubator industries, which were conducted in mid 1990s 
and sought to quantify the average capacity and the output 
of incubators with a selected array of metrics. The results of 
these surveys, which unexceptionally praised the impact of 
incubation on business formation and growth, soon became 
highly cited in the annual reports of responsible agencies 
and were thus widely disseminated [3]. However, academic 
literatures on evaluation mirrored the credibility of these 
surveys very differently [4]: the misplaced emphasis on 
incubators’ rather than incubated firms’ performance, the 
adoption of biased performance indicators, the 
underestimation of incubators’ operating costs and the 
disregard of the heterogeneity across different types of 
business incubators were altogether indentified as serious 
weaknesses of the abovementioned surveys and therefore 
were severely doubted to undermine those conclusions of 
the surveys. Moreover, as been pointed out by a few 
researchers, the methodologies that had been applied in 
these surveys were fundamentally problematic since they 
were simply measuring the impacts of incubation service 
(policy intervention) without any comparable counterfactual 
reference (equivalent businesses without incubation service). 
As a consequence, the results of these surveys may serve to 
provide a snapshot for the operation of incubator programs 
from some certain aspects, but were intrinsically unable to 
justify these programs superiority in assisting business 
development relative to the natural market environment [9]. 
Meanwhile, new survey designs that conform more to the 
principle of experimental method (EM) or at least allow the 
control of idiosyncrasies across incubators were widely 
proposed to address the preceding criticisms from different 
perspectives. Unfortunately, as we shall see in the 
subsequence of this paper, these propositions have been 
hardly used in practice to better inform policy making 
regardless of the variations in social and economic context. 
The lack of resources, training, quality control and, above 
all, political commitment at high levels has been reported 
everywhere to hinder the implementation of refined 
evaluation which is claimed to be based on more scientific 
and objective methods. In contrast, traditional yet highly 
defective evaluation methods are still popular and are 
routinely used to circumvent public scrutiny and justify 
decisions already taken.  
How shall we then understand this gap between 
aspiration and practice? In this paper, we seek to answer 
this question from two approaches, i) from a 
methodological perspective, we focus on the technical 
complicacy of EM and other advance evaluation methods 
which may potentially reduce their feasibility and 
popularity among agencies in charge of evaluation; ii) from 
an institutional perspective, we select and compare three 
cases in business incubator performance evaluation so as to 
identify those common and intangible factors that resist the 
use of EM in different national contexts and at different 
institutional levels. Specifically, we examine the most 
recent nationwide evaluation attempts made by the U.S., the 
European Union (EU) and China. We have chosen these 
jurisdictions because they are unanimously recognized as 
the most representative cases in business incubator research 
in the light of their incubation programs’ overwhelmingly 
large scale and influence and particularly their relatively 
mature models to operate these programs [5, 10-12]. 
Furthermore, their well-documented and widely 
disseminated efforts to comprehensively evaluate their 
incubator programs through nationwide surveys are still 
rare among other countries, yet are necessary and essential 
for the effort to develop an in-depth institutional analysis.  
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: in the 
next section we discuss the techniques of EM and its 
variants in seeking to demonstrate the observable, 
methodological challenges of using EM to evaluate the 
effectiveness of incubators. Following that, we present an 
analytical framework to guide the identification of latent, 
institutional barriers of applying EM in practice. The 
evaluation practices of the U.S., the EU and China are then 
structurally anatomized and summarized to draw out some 
of the similarities and differences among the three nations. 
Finally, we draw conclusions on the potential for using EM 
in business incubator evaluation. 
II.  THE METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
Since business incubators are intended to overcome the 
market failure in nurturing startup firms, the fundamental 
issue in incubator evaluation should be verifying the 
effectiveness of incubator’s services in assisting incubatees 
so that they could obtain better chance of survival and 
growth. Only after this issue has been correctly addressed 
would policies that endeavor to promote or curtail the 
incubator program be rested on a sound and solid ground. 
Such a verification process normally means to establish the 
causal relationship between incubation service and firm 
performance through comparing what happened to firms 
receiving the service with what would happen to them 
otherwise. This procedure is necessary whenever the effect 
of an imposed intervention, e.g. incubation service, is 
needed to be distinguished and disentangled from the 
changes occurring as the result of other forces and factors 
(the external environment) [13].  
Three research strategies are generally regarded as 
suitable to verify the causal relationship among variables of 
interest—the comparative method, the EM and the 
statistical method [14]. A principle common feature of the 
three methods is that they all seek to establish general 
empirical relationships among two or more variables while 
all other variables are controlled. In line with the discussion 
above, this feature is vital because one cannot be sure that 
the assumed relationship is true unless the influences of 
other variables are controlled. In the case of nationwide 
evaluation by surveys, the EM and statistical method are 
preferred to handle those aggregate data whereas the 
comparative method is often used to deal with data scarcity 
and the small-scale nature of initiatives. 
The EM, in its simplest form, would randomly assign 
equivalent samples to two groups, one of which (the 
experimental group) is exposed to an intervention while the 
other (the control group) is not. After the two groups are 
compared in this situation, any difference can be attributed 
to the intervention. Thus one could ascertain the existence 
of the causal relationship between intervention and the 
difference—with the critical assurance that no other factors 
are involved, because in all aspects but one the two groups 
are alike. At this point, equivalence between the 
experimental group and the control group must be achieved 
and guaranteed through a deliberate randomization process.  
Notwithstanding EM is the most nearly ideal method for 
testing the causal relationship, it can rarely be used in 
policy evaluation because of practical and ethical 
obstructions. Taking incubator evaluation as an example, 
first, people have to subjectively choose from an array of 
parameters, including the firm’s location, industry code and 
scale etc., to define the criteria of equivalence in sampling; 
second, sampled equivalent firms must be randomly 
assigned to an experimental group to be incubated and to a 
control group for subsequent comparison. In reality, 
however, socioeconomic phenomena such as firms have 
multidimensional characteristics and hence a specified 
criteria of equivalence if often partial and controversial. 
Further, there are very few incubators that would 
accommodate firms randomly assigned to them without any 
screen and thus deny the possibility of randomization. As a 
result, fundamental requirements of using EM usually 
become unrealistic when they are put against the context of 
most policy evaluation initiatives. 
A frequently used solution, in response to the infeasibility 
of EM in most social settings, is the Quasi-Experimental 
Method (QEM) [13, 15]. The most commonly used QEM is 
a “matching” technique that sources back to early stage 
social experimentation literature [16], which non-randomly 
construct a control group by statistically matching 
individuals with subjects in the experimental group to make 
the two groups as comparable as possible [17-19]. In 
principle, QEM relaxes EM’s “equivalence” restriction by 
tolerating the researchers’ discretion in setting up the 
control group, thus making comparisons possible in a 
setting where they were previously unavailable. Encouraged 
by the precedents in using QEM to evaluate the impact of 
training programs, employment subsidies and other 
economic development programs [20-22], efforts have also 
been made to explore the usage of QEM in business 
incubator evaluation. For instance, Sherman and Chappell 
[4] proposed to construct a control group of non-incubated 
firms in a quasi-experimental designed study in order to 
estimate the effects of business incubators, but they had to 
abandon the design because of the tremendous difficulty in 
identifying “untreated” firms and thus in compiling a 
statistically meaningful sample of non-incubated firms. 
Philips [23] took an alternative approach and constructed a 
control group constituted by firms that applied for 
membership to an incubator but were ultimately rejected. 
But this approach should be considered ad hoc in nature 
since not every incubator keeps records of rejected 
applicants, and hence a nationwide survey will run into the 
same problem as in the Sherman and Chappell case. 
A more serious methodological challenge in the use of 
QEM in business incubator evaluation is the resolution of 
the selection bias. In QEM, selection bias emerges if the 
subjects in the experimental group, in addition to the ones 
in the control group, are not randomly assigned. In specific, 
business admitted in incubators may be subject to two types 
of selection bias, and therefore, performance differences 
between incubated and non-incubated firms cannot be 
exclusively attributed to the incubation effect. The first type 
of bias is “self selection,” suggesting that business 
entrepreneurs who are seeking or are selected in incubation 
programs may be more motivated and equipped for 
business competition than average new business owners in 
the control group. As a consequence, the incubatees are 
very likely to outperform their peers in the control group. 
The other bias is “administrative selection,” indicating that 
competitive selection or screening processes of many 
business incubators would help them to identify and select 
the most promising businesses or at least avoid the least 
promising ones [5, 24]. As a result of the two selection 
biases, incubatees are meant to perform better than their 
matched non-incubated businesses regardless of whether 
they are incubated or not. Without properly controlling for 
these biases, the effects of incubation programs and the 
performance of incubators will likely be overestimated. 
In the preceding circumstances, some statistical methods 
have been developed either to account for selection biases 
[25, 26], or to replace the QEM as an approximation tool 
[13, 14]. To correct the selection bias, an exhaustive, if 
possible, list of individual characteristics that may predict 
individual’s participation in a given program can be 
identified and corresponding data be collected through 
surveys or interviews [27]. However, Heckman et al. warn 
that there will be a trade-off between the control of 
selection bias and the inclusion of individual predictive 
factors because the inclusion of such variables may, as an 
extreme example, make matching impossible. Further the 
mechanisms of these techniques are far too complicated for 
policymakers and practitioners to comprehend and operate. 
Therefore, as in the latter case, the statistical method has 
also been used as an alternative to the QEM which would 
normally require the control of the key variables that are 
known or suspected to exert influence on the dependent 
variable and the uses of partial correlations to distinguish 
the effects of intervention variables. As the price of its 
improved applicability in real policy evaluation, the 
statistical method has a higher risk of omitting some 
influential variables and thus based conclusions. 
Accordingly, the results of such statistical methods must be 
exposed to broader examinations and more cautious 
interpretations before any policy recommendation could be 
drawn upon them. 
III.  THE INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 
An Analytical Framework 
Following the standard “New Institutionalism” definition, 
institutions contain organizational structures and 
interactions, routines and procedures, norms and 
conventions of behavior, habits and belief systems, as well 
as the formal apparatus of the state [33]. We shall then 
approach the institutional challenges by exploring the 
professional capacities and institutional arrangements that 
affect the willingness and ability of a political system to use 
an EM approach in evaluating business incubator success. 
Such analysis can easily become immensely complex, so 
we particularly center on three representative cases from the 
US, the EU and China while simplifying the generalization 
process with an analytical framework, which will examine 
the evaluation activity at different institutional levels. This 
analytical framework contains three levels of analysis: 
The micro level is concerned with the availability of 
human resources (levels and types of expertise, training, 
background and skills of policy officials) as demanded by 
the EM in business incubator evaluation within the chief 
agencies. 
 The meso level is concerned with the organizational 
structure, namely organizational procedures and 
management structures, systems of knowledge transfer, 
norms and incentive structures. In particular, we shall 
examine i) the organizational attitude (norms and culture) 
toward the reliability and objectivity of evaluation and 
towards the value of science and knowledge in policy 
making; ii) the incentive structure that directs the selection 
of evaluation method in decision making; and iii) the 
commitment of appointed leaders to a scientific, 
evidence-based policy evaluation and the following 
decision making process. 
 Finally, since the ‘macro’/ constitutional/ higher level 
order is sometimes seen as providing the overarching 
societal structure within which decisions at other levels are 
taken, our macro level analysis will concentrate on the 
wider context, including the linkages with broader values, 
norm and societal goals, and connections with the larger 
policy network of stakeholders. Specifically, we will 
analyze i) the array of interests, goals, strategies of different 
stakeholders and the role of evaluation in the strategies of 
stakeholders which serve to influence the decision-making 
process; and ii) the original policy objective set by 
governments before evaluation. 
We explore the institutional barriers in the use of EM 
with the three-level framework for every case, in each 
country, to identify and characterize the main factors 
affecting the application of EM in the evaluation of 
business incubator performance. The following section 
presents a synthetic interpretation of these results to yield 
general lessons about institutional capacities and constraints 
to incorporate EM. 
 
Institutional Barriers in Practice 
 
Micro-level Barriers 
The background of policy officials and their designated 
experts were found to be a substantial micro-level 
constraint on the selection of a policy evaluation method 
and can have a conspicuous effect on the subjects chosen to 
be evaluated as well. Officials’ education and working 
experiences together shaped the way a specific evaluation 
method was perceived, especially from the utility and 
feasibility perspective. According to our previous analysis 
in the methodological challenges of using EM, proving the 
causal relationship between incubation service and better 
firm performance requires a profound knowledge of the EM, 
its variants and their strengths and weaknesses in respective 
under different situations. Such knowledge, unfortunately, 
is rarely obtained or understood by people other than 
professional scholars. Therefore, evaluation methods more 
technical than those direct comparisons being used to 
constitute benchmarking, or those evaluation subjects that 
may use such methods, are frequently labeled as “long”, 
“terribly complicated” and “infeasible” in the three cases 
[29, 30].  
Resources, such as time and money, are also a barrier to a 
varying extent. Many officials complained about the lack of 
time and money to seek improved evaluation design, mostly 
due to the irregularity of conducting evaluation. Although 
knowledge about the EM is a clear limit to the discovery of 
more fundamental policy issues and the use of optimized 
evaluation methods, it does not mean that the absence of 
such knowledge has not been recognized by policy makers. 
Respondents, particularly in the US report, increased time 
pressure to deliver policy proposals, causing there to be less 
time for analysis, reflection or strategic thinking on the way 
to improve evaluation design, understand the rationale and 
significance of better alternatives such as the EM, and to 
assist its implementation. A typical opinion expressed in 
China is that people in charge of the evaluation either have 
no access to, or have no time to acquire, advanced 
knowledge of evaluation [11]. 
 
Meso-level Barriers  
Organizational norms constitute major barriers to the 
recognition of the significance of EM. First, evaluation in 
general has been viewed as a largely irrelevant 
formality—an imposition rather than a helpful aid to 
decision making. In EU and China, the idea of evaluating 
the performance of business incubators was introduced late 
in the overall policy process, and hence had limited 
potential to contribute to the formation of project visioning. 
Consequently, policy decision has been understood as being 
made politically and thus depends on rationalities that differ 
from technical rationality. Benchmarking, which implicitly 
admits the effectiveness of business incubation and always 
justifies further investment as an effort to “improve” the 
performance, is therefore much more preferred politically 
than the risky EM. Second, most of the guidance on the use 
of evaluation methods aims to encourage less detailed and 
less time-consuming forms of assessment. Thus the use of 
advanced tools such as EM and integrated assessment 
models is downplayed while simple tools like 
benchmarking is advertised in detail and then mandated 
[31]. In China, for instance, a strong skepticism prevails 
towards formal analysis methods in general and economic 
tools (EM, cost-benefit analysis and economic modeling). 
Policy officials often consider their expert-based 
evaluations (drawing on professional experience, rules of 
thumb, advice from colleagues and external specialists etc.) 
as superior to formal analysis using complex methods [32, 
33]. These factors have contributed to a situation where 
formal evaluation tools like the EM are regarded as 
unfavorable to benchmarking when taking into account the 
indifference of officials to evaluation activity already in 
place. 
In addition, leaders of the administrative agency in each 
case often see formal assessment as a threat to their 
discretion as decision-makers. In the US case, executive 
officers in NBIA tended to see the results from EM as a 
possible impediment to their efforts to lobby for more 
funding through the legislative process [3]. For the agencies 
in charge of the policy, a lack of transparency means more 
freedom to internally assimilate the potential negative 
effects (or uncertainties about effectiveness) without the 
risk that this information is captured by EM and used for 
political purpose by actors distrusting business incubation. 
In this respect, as the EM would potentially take away 
flexibility and make it harder to avoid the pitfalls that 
emerge from the political process, it again becomes 
undesirable in difficult political contexts. 
 
Macro-level Barriers 
The methods and parameters of evaluating business 
incubation programs are also revealed to be strongly 
influenced by the purpose of the exercise and the values 
that are brought to bear. It is important to be aware of who 
is asking the question, why they are doing so, and what 
their preconceptions are about the answers. In the US, 
where business incubation was invented in the late 1950s 
and has experienced both prosperity and backset in the last 
half century, praises of and suspicions about its 
effectiveness persist. We see conflicting preconceptions 
toward such programs competing with one another among 
different institutional entities at the macro-level. As a result, 
despite the methodological challenges and the micro- and 
meso-level institutional barriers in the use of EM, initiatives 
attempting to verify the usefulness of business incubation 
programs are still being promoted and funded [3, 24, 34]. In 
contrast, China and the EU share the perception that their 
business environments are inferior to the U.S.’s in terms of 
promoting entrepreneurial startups [35]. Therefore, business 
incubators, as an imported instrument from the U.S, have 
been pre-conceptualized as a beneficial addition to their 
existing innovation ecosystems. Accordingly, these 
countries tend to pursue ways to improve and maximize the 
output of business incubators instead of challenging the 
efficacy of the initiative, where immense sunk costs and the 
reputation of the government in supporting economic 
development exist. Thus the Chinese government and the 
European Commission prefer forward looking evaluation 
methods such as benchmarking and the Participatory 
Evaluation Approach [36, 37] to the EM.. 
 Further, the pattern of stakeholder involvement 
presents another macro-level barrier in the use of EM or 
other advanced evaluation tools in the EU and China. 
Unlike the US case, where the main body of business 
incubation programs is a grass-roots phenomenon and 
involves substantial investment and participation of local 
stakeholders [38, 39], the European Commission or the 
Chinese central government independently promoted and 
sponsored the most of their incubation programs [10, 11]. 
Thereby, business incubators are often results of the 
agreements between ambitious local governments who 
normally commit to an administrative role, and the central 
government who assumes the investment responsibility. As 
a consequence, stakeholder involvement is restricted to 
providing peripheral networks for the operation of the 
incubator in the EU and China rather than evaluating its 
effectiveness or redirecting its strategy. From this 
perspective, the value of EM has more leeway to be 
advocated and acknowledged in the evaluation of US 
business incubation programs since their ownership 
structures are much more diversified and hence require the 
use of more objective and scientific evaluation method to 
convince stakeholders to continue their investment. 
                IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the worldwide adoption of business incubators 
by policy makers as the Holy Grail for entrepreneurship and 
business development, solid evidence of the advantages of 
business incubators in enhancing the competitiveness of 
client firms remains elusive. In this paper, we ascribe the 
vagueness and imprecision in evaluating the effectiveness 
of business incubation to the failure of identifying and 
engaging the appropriate methodology, viz. the EM. Our 
study first reviews the methodological challenges to the use 
of EM and then identifies those institutional barriers at the 
micro, meso and macro-levels, which further exacerbated 
the problem. There are also complex and overlapping 
relationships between these levels. For instance, the 
operation of incubation program evaluation at the 
meso-level is often influenced by macro-level 
preconceptions while the micro-level barriers such as 
availability of time and relevant knowledge apparently have 
their roots at meso and macro-levels. 
Our analysis also inspires reflections on how to achieve 
the rationality and objectivity of policy evaluation in a 
messy world of policy making. While the routine use of 
policy evaluation has promised more public scrutiny of 
policy proposals and introduced some bounded forms of 
rationality into the decision making process, one may 
question that the calls for methodologically sound 
approaches or objectivity (evidence-based policy making) 
actually overestimate the value of evaluation in a real policy 
making process which is intrinsically ad hoc and can only 
be incrementally improved. The uncompromising request 
for evidence constructed by a certain method (i.e. the EM) 
is also disputable, given claims that evidence is itself a 
social construct [40] which can be used by powerful actors 
to pursue their interests. Our evidence indicates that simply 
aspiring to the application of objective and scientific 
method in evaluation are far beyond the institutional 
tolerance of associated agencies and thus are not making 
evaluation more welcomed there. 
We suggest that to use EM in practice will inevitably 
require a surmounting of the institutional barriers, which 
demands an in-depth analysis of the institutional settings, 
purposes and strengths and weaknesses of the method, and 
above all, long-term engagement in the process by analysts 
and policy makers. With respect to the evaluation of 
business incubation programs, in particular, an effort to 
build a suitable database, to design more actable EM variant 
and to locate stakeholders for sponsoring the evaluation, is 
a necessary first step. 
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